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Abstract: This paper looks at a new body of literature that deals with two-sided markets 
and focuses on the Internet Service Provider (ISP) segment. ISPs seem to act as a 
platform enabling transactions between web sites and end consumers. We propose a 
strategic guide for ISPs that covers features of two-sided markets such as strong 
externalities and discuss how these market characteristics can affect competition policy. 
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n the internet, interactions between firms and/or consumers play an 
important role. Interactions between two (or more) parties are possible 
due the existence of "platforms" owned by third parties. The economics 
of these "two-sided markets" is the focus of a large amount of literature 
which has been published recently. 
Following EVANS (2004), we can argue that a platform constitutes the 
set of the institutional arrangements necessary to realise a transaction 
between two users groups. Many markets can be seen as two-sided:  
- the academic review market, since reviews compete to attract authors 
and readers; 
- the video game market, where, the Sony Playstation, for example, is 
the platform and Sony is trying to attract game video providers and final 
users; 
- a newspaper (or more generally media) is a platform between 
advertisers and readers. 
One important characteristic of two-sided markets is the presence of 
network externalities between the two different groups using the platform. 
There is a large amount of literature on positive network externalities (KATZ 
& SHAPIRO,1985, 1986; FARRELL & SALONER, 1985, 1986). However, in 
this literature, users belong to the same group and externalities are "intra-
I
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group" externalities, whereas in a two-sided market there are two different 
groups of users, and externalities are "inter-group" externalities. 
The paper deals with the following questions. How can a two-sided 
market be identified? What are the features of such markets? What are the 
implications of these markets for competition policy and platform strategies? 
We propose to focus on the Internet Service Providers (ISP) market. 
Indeed in this market, ISPs attempt to attract web sites and users, and so 
would appear to be platforms. This situation is particularly true of the B2B 
segment. Indeed, Internet users on the platform are willing to buy CD or 
books from Fnac or Amazon, for example. 
The second section of the paper studies the features of two-sided 
markets and their pricing implications. This is followed by a strategic guide 
for ISPs, while the fourth section focuses on ISP strategy in the presence of 
multihoming. Lastly, we propose to study the implications of ISPs on 
regulatory and competition policy. The paper ends with a few concluding 
remarks. 
  Features of two-sided markets 
This section analyses the main features of two-sided markets by focusing 
on the nature of the externalities involved and then assessing their 
implications on the prices set by platforms.  
We retain the same definition of the two-sided market adopted by both 
EVANS (2004) and REISINGER (2003). A market is said to be two-sided if: 
"at any point in time there are (a) two distinct groups of customers; (b) 
the value obtained by one kind of customers increases with the 
number of the other kind of customers; and (c) an intermediary is 
necessary for internalizing the externalities created by one group for 
the other group". 
Externalities in two-sided markets 
The presence of two different user groups calls for a modification to the 
standard analysis of externalities. We can distinguish between two main sets 
of externalities in a two-sided market: membership externalities and usage 
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externalities. The first set closely resembles classical externalities, such as 
positive network externalities. Indeed there are positive externalities in the 
telecommunications industry, which have been analysed by KATZ & 
SHAPIRO (1985), as well as FARRELL & SALONER (1985).  
The first feature of two-sided market is the membership externality. We 
can describe this external effect as follows. The more consumers connected 
to the platform, the greater the number of consumers will want to join this 
platform. ARMSTRONG (2004a) referred to this effect as the membership 
externality. For example, the greater the number of consumers connected to 
an ISP, the more consumers will be willing to pay to join the ISP in order to 
be able to exchange traffic. In two-sided markets, however, the membership 
externality results from the presence of the two different user groups. This 
means that the greater the number of web sites (ergo consumers) connected 
to the platform, the more attractive the latter (and the web sites accessed via 
the ISP) become from a consumer's point of view.  
The second feature results from the interaction between the two user 
groups. That is referred to as the usage externality. The usage externality 
arises from one or several interactions caused by the ISP between web sites 
and internet users. As ROSON (2004) notes, there are: 
- markets where only one interaction exists, such as estate agencies; 
- markets with several interactions, as is the case with the ISP market. 
The interactions can be repeated. From this point of view, each agent 
receives some benefit from each interaction. This is true of the Google 
web site, for example, and for B2B more generally. 
To summarize, there are two kinds of externalities. The usage externality 
results from the interaction between two different user groups, whereas the 
membership externality refers to the installed base. 
General implications of externalities on ISPs' strategy 
The presence of externalities in two-sided markets has implications on 
the prices set by platforms, allowing us to draw a distinction between two-
sided markets and their classical counterparts. This presence impacts both 
the price level and the price structure. In this respect, ROCHET & TIROLE 
(2004) argue that price structure can provide a basis for identifying two-sided 
markets. Since there are two different user groups, ISPs face two distinct 
types of demand. Thus the global end price is composed of a price paid by 
the web site and a price paid by internet users. The presence of externalities 
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and the existence of two different prices raise the issue of price allocation. 
This in turn raises poses key questions. What are the efficient price level and 
an efficient allocation of prices from the platform's point of view? What are 
the implications of the presence of positive externalities?  
The first implication is essential. EVANS (2003) affirms that the price on 
each side can be different. In cases where demand is developed on each 
side, price level and allocation play an important role in maintaining two 
different types of consumer. We can argue with ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) 
that since there is a membership externality, the price charged by ISPs for a 
transaction decreases with the size of the installed base. Again, this effect 
closely resembles the network positive externality. However, the usage 
externality may be internalised by the user groups through the price 
structure set by the platform. In this case EVANS (2004) argues that the 
service is jointly consumed by the two types of users in two-sided markets, 
and the usage externality exists only if the transaction takes place.  
Figure 1 - An ISP as a platform 
Platform (ISP)
Web site (S) Web site (S)
Access Access
aB aS
 
Therefore the presence of externalities 1 implies that the aim of an ISP is 
not to offer cost-oriented and symmetric prices, but to balance demand 
between websites and internet users. In other words, discrimination is 
possible. In these conditions, a market can be described as two-sided if it is 
characterised by the following phenomenon. There is a confrontation 
between supply (websites) and demand (internet users), which, when 
combined, also express a demand ISP access to realise transactions. The 
ISP market structure is illustrated in the diagram above. 
                     
1 It is worth noting that potential negative externalities do exist. This is the case with advertising 
in newspapers. Indeed, consumers are willing to pay more to have less advertising. For a more 
detailed analysis of this point see FERRANDO, GABSZEWICZ, LAUSSEL & SONNAC (2004) 
AND GABSZEWICZ, LAUSSEL & SONNAC (2002). 
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In this situation it is easy to understand the distinction proposed by 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) between the price level (the total price set by the 
platform) and price structure (allocation). Thus there is no evidence that the 
two types of users equally share the total price for access to the ISP. As 
underlined above by the definition, the benefit gained by a consumer 
(website or internet user) results from their interactions on the platform. 
Hence, in such markets, a consumer on side i  earns a positive net surplus 
from interactions with another consumer on side j i≠ . This feature refers to 
the usage externality, whereas the membership externality refers to the 
decision (ex ante) to join the platform, for a given fixed fee.  
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) explain the features of two-sided markets in 
the following way. They argue that, from a theoretical point of view, it is 
impossible to apply Coase's theorem (1960) to two sided markets, since the 
transaction between sellers and buyers takes place only if there is a 
platform. This implies the presence of a third party, which owns the platform, 
and prevents direct bargaining between the agents. The authors conclude 
that, in a Coasian world, the price structure would be neutral. In other words, 
there would be neutrality in the allocation of the total price. However, as 
explained above, this is not the case in two-sided markets. Since there is no 
pricing neutrality, ISP strategy should be based on price allocation.  
  Pricing strategy for ISPs: a strategic guide  
To introduce this topic, we can distinguish between internal competition 
occurring within the same platform, and external competition, which occurs 
between two or more platforms (see ROSON, 2004).  
In this context, externalities have major implications for price structure. 
Thus, if the price on one side of the market decreases, for internet users for 
example, they tend to use the platform more. However, at the same time, the 
other side, which consists of web sites, also stands to benefit from this. 
Indeed when the price decreases, the direct effect is as follows: there are 
more internet users, so the incentive for web sites to join the platform 
increases. This result is not surprising. However, interaction between the 
different user groups modifies the standard results of competition à la 
Bertrand, since the prices are cost-oriented. Thus the utility derived by one 
group depends on the number of users in the other group.  
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In this context price allocation is an important issue. ARMSTRONG 
(2004b) and ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) present an overview of this price 
allocation problem. Their analyses insist on externalities and their 
implications for prices, in line with LAFFONT, MARCUS, REY & TIROLE 
(2003) who study ubiquitous connectivity. More precisely, they consider a 
platform as a monopoly 2 in order to explain how price allocation is affected 
by different factors such as:  
- multihoming,  
- user costs,  
- platform differentiation,  
- a platform's capacity to use a price based on the number of 
transactions (ROCHET & TIROLE, 2003), 
- the number of users (ARMSTRONG, 2004b), 
- externalities between user groups (ROCHET & TIROLE, 2003) and 
within a group (ARMSTRONG, 2004b). 
In order to illustrate this topic, this paper studies the pricing strategy for a 
monopolistic ISP in order to underline the impact of a two-sided market's 
features. 
A theoretical framework: a monopolistic ISP 
In line with ARMSTRONG (2004b), ROCHET & TIROLE (2003), we 
consider that the monopoly offers linear prices on the two sides. In this 
situation the aim for an ISP should be to define a price level, but also an 
efficient price allocation between web sites and internet users. 
ARMSTRONG (2004b) focuses on the membership externality, while 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) focus on the usage externality.  
ARMSTRONG (2004b) compares a situation in whereby a platform 
maximizes the global welfare of the industry to a situation whereby it sets 
prices to maximize its own profits. In cases where platforms maximize social 
welfare, prices are below fixed costs, since prices are defined by this cost 
minus a parameter of the externality related to the other side of the market. 
In cases where the platform maximizes its own profit, the price is equal to 
the fixed cost minus the externality plus a factor related to the demand 
elasticity of the group in question, and given the participation of the other 
                     
2 Or that the connectivity is the same for the platforms. 
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side. ARMSTRONG (2004b) concludes that is the membership externality 
that determines the allocation of prices. 
The first insight into pricing strategy is consequently provided by the 
membership externality. It is worth noting that the pricing strategy for a 
monopolistic ISP could be to identify the side of the market most sensitive to 
the network effect.  
ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) focus on the usage externality. This could be 
more realistic in our framework since several transactions take place 
between the internet and web sites.  
As a result, the price depends on the elasticity of the side in question. 
This is noted by a Lerner index as follows:  
S B
S B
S B
p pp p c η η+ − = =  
where Bp  and Sp  are the price respectively for the buyers (internet 
users) and the sellers (web sites) and Sη  and Bη  represent the respective 
elasticity of demand from each group. The interesting insight afforded by 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) is that prices are inversely proportional to 
elasticity.  
It follows that ISP strategy should consider the side of the market more 
sensitive to price by analysing the direct elasticity on each side impacted by 
the usage externality. Internet users should thus be more sensitive than web 
sites. 
A strategic pricing guide in the presence of ISP competition 
ISP competition with single-homing 
In line with the principles described above (network effect and elasticity), 
this section considers competition between ISPs, in cases of single home 
connection i.e. where each side can only be connected to one platform.  
ARMSTRONG (2004b) focuses on competition between ISPs that 
provide services perceived as different by users. The author supposes that 
each consumer, web site or internet user, can be connected to one exclusive 
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ISP only. The first insight provided by this study is that the net surplus for 
each group is a function of the external benefit of having an additional 
consumer in the group. Its main conclusion is that ISPs should consider this 
external benefit as a measure of the opportunity cost.  
This means that, since there is competition between ISPs, their strategy 
should be based on avoiding price hikes to discourage consumers from 
switching to a competitor's platform. The expression of price is simple. It is 
the sum of fixed costs and the substitutability parameter (since services are 
perceived as different), minus the valorisation of the inter-group externality 
resulting from the transaction. Moreover, this means that pricing is generally 
not cost-oriented. 
The impact of single homing on pricing strategy can be summarised as 
follows:  
• In the presence of single homing, the more the users on one side 
place a high value on the presence of the other group, the lower the price 
determined by the ISP should be.  
• However, the single homing hypothesis is not really consistent with 
the ISP market. Web sites, in particular, can be connected to several 
platforms.  
ISP competition with multihoming  
Following on from ARMSTRONG (2004b) and ROCHET & TIROLE 
(2003), this section considers cases whereby one side of the market can 
multi home, i.e. connect to several platforms. In these conditions the result is 
naturally as follows. 
The inter group externality arising from transactions or the usage 
externality is more valued by the users' multihoming. As a result, competition 
takes place only on the single home side.  
ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) propose a more general model than 
ARMSTRONG (2004b). They suppose that web sites are connected to two 
different platforms, and that internet users choose the platform where 
transactions take place. Transactions will take place when the benefit to 
each user on each side (buyer and seller) is higher than the price set by the 
platform. At first the authors postulate that the price levels proposed by each 
ISP are the same. 
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In these conditions web sites have three different possibilities. They 
realise no transaction if the price is higher than the value generated by the 
transaction. Secondly, the choice of connection to one or two platforms 
implies the following trade off: a web site compares its net surplus expressed 
by the difference between the benefit stood to be gained and the price in 
view of demand from internet users in the two situations (multihoming versus 
single home). Thus, the ISP's strategy consists of setting a price lower than 
its rivals in order to limit the incentive for web sites to become multihoming. 
Indeed, when a platform decreases its price, this increases its own demand 
and attracts web sites that were previously multihoming. 
To represent this trade-off ROCHET & TIROLE (2003) define the 
following index 3:  
1 2
B B B
J
i B
i
d d D
d
σ + −=  
With [ ]0,1iσ ∈ , this index provides a measure of consumer loyalty to 
the platform i . BJD  corresponds to the proportion (demand) of internet 
users (buyers) who are willing to use the platform j when web sites are 
exclusively connected to the platform j  ( 1,2j = ). Bid  ( 1,2i = ) 
corresponds to the proportion (demand) of the internet users who are willing 
to proceed to a transaction on the platform i when the seller is multihoming. 
So when 0iσ = , all web sites are multihoming. On the contrary for 
1 2
B B B
jd d D+ = , 1iσ =  all web sites are single home ( B Bj iD d= ). 
The outcome of competition, where the aim of the platform is to maximize 
its own profit, closely resembles the outcome of the monopoly situation. We 
can note 4: 
% %( )/
B S
B S
B S
p pp p c η η σ
+ − = =  
where %Bη  and %Sη  respectively represent the demand-elasticity of internet 
users and of web sites for a given platform, where the transaction takes 
place. It is worth noting that the web sites' elasticity is corrected by the index 
                     
3 Where the index B refers to buyers,  thus to internet users. 
4 Where the index S refers to buyers, thus to web sites. 
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of loyalty. When web sites are connected to an exclusive platform, ( 1σ = ) 
this produces the monopoly result. 
In cases where multihoming is widespread, the sensitivity of web site 
demand to price variations is higher. As a result, a small decrease in the 
price of one platform implies that web sites have incentives to move from 
multihoming to the single-home model. ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) conclude 
that there are cross subsidies between the two sides. The authors call this 
principle the "topsy-turvy principle". This can be defined as follows: an 
increase in the price on one side implies an increase in the mark-up for the 
platform, but also implies a decrease in price on the other side, in order to 
attract users and to preserve balanced demands. 
As a result, the more widespread multihoming becomes, the more 
platform competition implies a decrease in price on the web site side. Finally, 
the volume of transactions depends not only on the overall price, but also on 
price allocation. The price structure is again not neutral in the presence of 
competition with multihoming. 
Finally ISP pricing strategy should be guided by the following factors, 
which all have an impact on price allocation: 
• Elasticity: For example, if the installed based on one side increases 
and if this side is captive, then it is profitable for the platform to increase its 
price (for web sites, for example) in order to decrease the price on the other 
side and attract new buyers (internet users). 
• The web site's market power: if web sites enjoy significant market 
power, then the platform could decrease the price it charges those service 
providers to decrease the double marginalization effect. 
• In the ISP market internet users can be seen as "marquee buyers," as 
highlighted by ROCHET & TIROLE (2003). Indeed, their presence has a 
high value for web sites and thus modifies the price structure. This effect 
implies that ISPs could set a lower price for buyers and a higher price for 
web sites. 
• The consequences of multihoming are not clear. Indeed, if some on 
the internet users' side are connected to several platforms then price 
sensitivity appears to increase on this side (higher elasticity). Platforms can 
react in the following way: to create an incentive for web sites to stop 
multihoming, ISPs may decide to charge them low prices. 
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According to EVANS (2004) other factors impact the price structure such 
as investment on one side of the market, since an investment allows the 
platform to decrease the price on this side. As a result, this strategy makes it 
possible to attract new consumers on the other side. Moreover Evans 
argues that multihoming offers a key insight in the study of two-sided 
markets. Multihoming consequently implies higher competitive pressure and 
tends to decrease prices.  
Competition for market share among ISPs 
The analysis above explains how the features of two-sided markets affect 
price structure, making them subject to economic consequences that differ 
from standard effects. Under such circumstances, a platform may have an 
incentive to modify price structure according to the valorisation of the usage 
externality. Thus, the demand of one side tends to decrease if the demand 
of the other is too low. In this context the following two questions arise:  
• Which strategy should a platform adopt to attract both sides and reach 
critical installed bases on each side?  
• On which side should demand be stimulated first by the platform? 
In a competitive environment ISPs must be able to defend their existing 
market share, as well as bidding for new clients. 
CAILLAUD & JULLIEN (2003) and JULLIEN (2001) look at this issue in 
greater detail. Following Caillaud and Jullien, we can argue that ISPs must 
own an important installed base of web sites in order to attract internet 
users. However, web sites will only be willing to pay if they anticipate that a 
large number of internet users will be present. That is the chicken and egg 
problem. 
The authors argue that a possible strategy for platforms (in our case: 
ISPs) is to "divide and conquer" the market. This platform strategy is based 
on dividing one side to conquer the other, with price discrimination arising in 
two-sided markets. Caillaud and Jullien focus on market structure and 
platform strategies. The study considers imperfect competition with a two 
part tariff between platforms, whereby the services provided can be 
exclusive (single home) or non exclusive (multihoming). 
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Competition for market share with exclusive services 
Exclusive services denote a single home connection. In this case, all 
users on both sides prefer to belong to the same platform. The ISP's 
strategy is consequently based on subventions on one side. As a result, with 
exclusive services externalities tend to favour market concentration market. 
This appears to be an efficient market structure, which generates low profits 
as a result. CAILLAUD & JULLIEN (2003, 2004) explain this effect as 
follows.  
Let suppose that two platforms compete against each other for exclusive 
services. This implies that all users single home. A platform could decrease 
the price on the Internet users' side in order to attract web sites, which stand 
to gain a higher net surplus from connection to this platform. This process 
can be repeated, turning the monopoly into an efficient structure with low 
profits. In other words, when services are exclusive, competitive pressure is 
high. This is true as long as transaction prices are not distorted, that means 
as long as the price enables ISPs to collect all the profit on one side and 
subsidize the other. Under such circumstances subsidies would appear to 
represent a competitive strategy and entail a concentrated market structure. 
When there is intense competition for market share with exclusive 
services, a concentrated market may offer an efficient market structure.  
Competition for market share with non exclusive services  
This section examines cases where competition takes place with non 
exclusive services. In many cases users are connected to several platforms 
(multihoming). This is particularly true of internet users. CAILLAUD & 
JULLIEN (2003) show that service providers have incentives to propose non 
exclusive services when competitive pressure is not too high in order to 
exercise their market power. In such cases it is easy to divide (to subsidize), 
but more difficult to conquer. With non exclusive services the competitive 
pressure is lower, making it more difficult to attract new users 
Finally ARMSTRONG & WRIGHT (2004) provide an analysis of this topic 
based on endogenous users' decisions between exclusive and non 
exclusive services. Their results close resemble those cited above. We can 
consequently argue that:  
An optimal strategy for ISPs is to sustain losses on one side in order to 
achieve a critical installed base on this side. The "divide and conquer" 
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strategy consists of ISPs subsidizing internet users in order to attract them. 
Once their participation is obtained on this side, there is a bandwagon effect 
that allows the platform to recover the subsidy through the fixed fee paid by 
web sites on the other side. This platform strategy is based on the idea of 
"buying" the participation of one side in order to create some value for the 
other due to the presence of inter group externalities. As seen above, many 
factors have implications for the price structure and ISP strategy.  
  Implications for regulatory and competition policy 
It seems that the usual principles of competition in terms of price level 
and allocation are modified in two-sided markets. More specifically, the 
membership externality and usage externality imply that ISP strategy is not 
based on cost-oriented prices, but on the ability to achieve balanced 
demand. We have shown that the price strategy depends not only on 
competitive pressure and elasticity, but also on externalities and their 
valorisation for each group, according to whether there is multihoming or not. 
As a result, the different level of valorisation impacts both on pricing strategy 
and on competition to maintain and conquer market share. Under such 
circumstances, a pricing strategy could consist of subsidizing one side to 
attract consumers on the other. Those questions need to be debated from a 
regulatory and competition policy point of view. 
Competitive policy and price structure 
A first insight is afforded by the impact of externalities on price structure, 
which is not neutral in two sided markets. An efficient price structure is no 
longer cost-oriented. However, it seems essential to take into account the 
surplus received by each consumer, web site and internet user from 
transactions. 
A price above marginal cost does not reflect market power 
Indeed interactions between the two sides imply counter-intuitive effects. 
As shown with the "divide and conquer" strategy, we can affirm with EVANS 
(2004) that the estimation of market power should take both sides of the 
market into consideration. This is particularly true if a price is higher than 
marginal cost on one side, and below marginal cost on the other. 
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Competition policy in a traditional market can embrace price distortion (price 
below marginal cost) in the short term; but is opposed to this principle once 
the market becomes mature.  
Thus, competition policy can not consider these prices separately. This 
policy is not relevant for two-sided markets, where goods or services are 
only sold if the platform attracts sufficient users on both sides. In this 
framework the competition authority seems unable to analyse collective 
welfare without taking the price level, price allocation and the external effects 
created by the presence of the two sides into account. 
A strategy based on cross subsidies is not a predatory strategy  
in a two-sided market 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) compare a two sided market with a vertically 
related market structure. They suppose that a vertical organization in which 
there is no direct relation with consumers (downstream market), but only 
with sellers. In two-sided markets, if sellers enjoy significant market power, 
platforms may have an incentive to subsidize prices in order to increase the 
buyers' surplus and their willingness to pay. Another strategy according to 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) is to encourage competition on one side, in 
order to attract users on the other side. Platforms thus have an incentive to 
offer cost-oriented prices. This stimulates interactions and tends to make the 
volume of transactions optimal.  
If we consider a vertical market structure such positive effects are limited 
because there is no internalization of the benefits resulting from transactions 
when platforms contract with sellers only. The authors demonstrate that 
foreclosure is less possible in two-sided markets. 
The key insight of their study is the existence of differences in the 
economic effects of one sided and two-sided markets. According to 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) a platform is able to control or regulate 
interactions. This is not the case in a vertical related market. Their analysis 
becomes valid again if we consider a price lower than marginal cost and this 
does not imply to a predatory pricing strategy. In a two-sided market, it is 
essential to consider that a given service is provided to each user on each 
side at the same time. 
T. CORTADE 31 
Competitive policy and market concentration 
A concentrated market is not an inefficient market structure 
Increasing the number of firms in a market, as is the case in a 
competitive multihoming scenario, has no positive impact on price structure. 
Under such circumstances we have shown that internet users may pay a 
lower price, since the ISP's strategy consists of reaching a critical installed 
base on this side. On the other side, web sites are usually willing to pay a 
higher price to participate in transactions.  
As a result, a more competitive two-sided market does not imply that the 
price structure is more balanced.  
Moreover, if we consider a merger between ISPs like EVANS (2004), we 
can argue that when competition policy faces a merger between two 
platforms, the presence of the two sides must be considered. In general 
terms, competition policy accepts or refuses the merger in view of the 
evolution of prices. However, the total price must be considered in two-sided 
markets. Indeed a price increase on one side can reflect a decrease on the 
other in order to preserve balanced demand. So a price decrease on one 
side increases willingness to pay on the other side. In the end the variation 
in the total price may be low, although the price structure has changed 
significantly.  
Price regulation and interconnection in two sided markets 
Price regulation is not neutral if this regulation only attributes a 
competitive advantage to regulated firms. In two-sided markets WRIGHT 
(2004) underlines that a non regulated firm will not want to match a 
suboptimal price structure imposed on a regulated firm. In other words, 
suppose regulation prevents one side from participating. The first impact of 
regulation is to decrease prices. However, users may prefer to pay more to 
access the non regulated platform if installed bases are larger, thus enabling 
the non regulated firm to increase its market share and profits. 
This analysis of regulatory policy can be extended in line with LAFFONT, 
MARCUS, REY & TIROLE (2003). They provide a model which considers a 
reciprocal access charge in a two-sided market. The framework analysis is 
as follows: two ISPs compete at the same time for final users and for web 
sites. The authors suppose that to exchange traffic, the ISPs set a reciprocal 
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access charge for termination. This means that the ISP at the origination of 
the traffic must pay an access charge to its rival for termination. Finally, 
users' decision to join one exclusive ISP (i.e. single homing) is endogenous.  
The ISPs are considered as perfect substitutes from the consumer's point 
of view. The total price set by an ISP consists of the price set for consumers, 
plus the price fixed for web sites. The authors adopt the "off-net cost 
principle". Moreover, they suppose that the hypothesis of the "balanced 
calling pattern" is respected. This highlights an important difference between 
their views and theoretical literature on the telecommunications industry. The 
receivers of traffic pay a price to receive calls, which is not true in 
telecommunications. This has two major implications. The first is related to 
prices, while the second is linked to competition stability. 
The impact on price is as follows: when a consumer receives traffic 
without paying, ISPs are left to pick up the perceived marginal cost (as 
pointed out by LAFFONT, REY & TIROLE, 1998a). However, when 
consumers pay to receive traffic, the perceived marginal cost is only equal to 
the opportunity cost of losing a consumer who may switch to another ISP. 
This is the result of the usage externality in two-sided markets. Moreover, 
competition stability is stronger in this context. Indeed, when receivers do 
not pay for traffic, then equilibrium can only exist if the access charge is 
close to the marginal cost for termination or if the networks are close 
substitutes.  Yet in the scenario outlined above this is never the case, since 
the sum of the prices (for each side) is just equal to the traffic cost, 
independently of the access charge level. The access charge only 
determines how cost is allocated between the two sides.  
As a result, the price structure implied by externalities modifies the 
access pricing problem. Here again, it is the study of the total price that is 
relevant. 
All the features can potentially modify the tools used by competition 
policy. In short, two main difficulties for competition policy arise with regard 
to two-sided markets. The first is characterized by the utility received by 
consumers, since there are usage and membership externalities. Although it 
is difficult to measure these externalities, they must be taken into account in 
studies of two-sided markets. The second difficulty concerns the advantages 
that consumers derive from price structure that enable them to perform 
transactions at the lowest possible cost. It is important to consider that the 
benefits on one side increase with participation on the other. Again, it is not 
easy to take this effect into account in competition policy. 
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However, there is no reason to believe that non competitive behaviour is 
more widespread in two-sided markets. In fact, behaviour is just different, 
with prices not set based on cost on each side, for example. Moreover, price 
level and allocation must be determined in order to maximize output. In such 
cases, it is important to increase installed bases on each side to solve the 
chicken and egg problem. From this point of view, CAILLAUD & JULLIEN 
(2003) show how dominant firms prefer to set prices related to volumes of 
transactions, rather than a fixed fee when entry is impossible. Like 
ARMSTRONG (2004b), CAILLAUD & JULLIEN (2003) show that the 
pressure of competition is more intense without multihoming. This fact 
seems to oppose economic intuitions.  
  Conclusion  
This paper attempts to offer a strategic guide to two sided markets, and 
to identify the difficulties for competition and regulatory policy with regard to 
the features of two-sided markets. 
At first, our analysis shows that two-sided markets differ from their 
classical counterparts because there is a third party involved that is subject 
to two different types of demand. The platform allows transactions between 
different user groups. As a result, there are two types of externality. The first 
externality, also present in the telecommunications industry, is the 
membership externality, whereas usage externality is specific to the two 
sided market structure. Thus users of the platform benefit from the presence 
of members on the other side.  
Such interactions have an impact on price level, and especially on the 
allocation of the total price between the two sides of the market. Indeed, 
platforms charge each side a price. In such cases, it is possible for the third 
party to charge one side a price below marginal cost and the other a price 
that is higher than this cost. However, as demonstrated above, such prices 
do not express cross subsidies or market power. Price allocation is not 
neutral.  
As a result, we show that competition policy tools can be modified by 
such features of two sided markets. The most efficient market structure is 
not always competition (multihoming). On the contrary, concentrated 
markets can be justified since there are strong externalities. Similarly, 
mergers are not necessarily detrimental to the industry. The second insight 
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of our paper is the impact on competition and regulatory policy of the 
presence of externalities. We show that a price that is higher than marginal 
cost doesn't reflect market power, while a strategy based on cross subsidies 
is not a predatory strategy in a two-sided market. We also demonstrate that 
a concentrated market is not an inefficient market structure and that price 
regulation in two-sided markets would be not neutral. 
Finally, we assess the impact of such features on the interconnection 
market. When we consider two-way interconnection in telecommunications, 
the theoretical literature on the topic shows that competition between 
symmetric networks arises from collusion and implies exclusion when these 
networks are asymmetric. In two sided markets, on the other hand, the role 
of the reciprocal access charge is modified since this charge makes it 
possible to determine price allocation. In such cases it is essential for 
competition policy to study a two sided market and the strategic behaviour of 
its players by considering the total price, not the price paid by each side. 
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